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Since most of our torts had
their inception hundreds of years
ago in England, the cause of action
known as bad faith is a flev/ devel-
opment. Nevertheless, in its short
history in Montana, it has already
been the subject of an intense tug of
war between those who view it as a
necessary tool
for balancing
the disparity of
power between
consumers and
corporations
and those who
view it as an in-
tolerable pox on
corporâte profits. Insurance bad
fatth and its attendant threat of
punitive damages ate the most vi-
able and effective tools plaintiffs
counsel has at his or her disposal for
enforcing duties and promises of
insurance companies. In Montana,
the courts originally created insur-
ance bad faith tort and, when neces-
sary, based it on violations of the
state insurance code. Ironically, the
Iegislature's attempts to restrict in-
suraflce bad faith in the name of tort
"refoffn" have resulted in codifica-
tion of a good deal of common law
followed by expansive couft inter-
pretations of the statute. F{ence, the
tort is very much alive and evolving
in 2000. Within the limits of these
pages, I will outline the develop-
ment of the tort of bad faith as it
applies to insurance in Montana
ending with particular attention to
the issue of the existence now of
bad faith tort outside the Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices ,\ctt. ,\t
the outset, I want to thank Pat
Sheehy md Gary Zzdick fot theit
invaluable review and cornment on
this work.
Early History of the Tort
In 1,964, Federal Judge Jami-
son delivered the landmark opinion
of lessen u. ODanief which recog-
nized an insuret's liability to its own
insured for failure to accept a. rca-
sonable settlement offer on a clatrn
against the insured. The often-cited
case received national attention and,
to this day, is the seminal word in
Insofar as it placed on an in-
surer a liability over and above its
contractually promised limit of cov-
erage,Jesseru was the first "bad faith"
case in Montana. It was a "fust-
patty" "excess-covetage" case. J essen
was followed by similar fìrst-party
excess-coverage cases including Fer-
ter Liue¡tock Co. u.
National Fanners
Union Properry dz
Casaaltjt Co.,'
Fou/er u. State Farn
Mut. Aato. Ins.
C0.,6 and, Thornp-
soru u. Stale Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co.1 , which applied rhe luseru factors
while mixing concepts of bad faith
and negligence. F{owever, in each
case the courts found that the in-
surer's conduct was not actionable.
In the Jessen era, the courts
contributed a couple of contract de-
cisions important to the history of
bad faith law and punitive damages
in Montana. First, in ll/ufall u. Mo-
tors In¡. Corp.,8 the Montana Supreme
Court held that one could not obta:n
punitive damages for a breach of
contract even though the breach was
willfrrl or fraudulent. However, in
State ex rv/. Larson u. Districl Court of
the Etþth Judicial Dist.,e the court, for
insurance contracts, made an excep-
tion to the lYestfall rule. The l-¿r¡on
court noted that MCA 527-1-202
provides "[e]very person who suf-
fers detriment ftom the unlawful act
or omission of another may recover
from the person in fault a compen-
sation therefore in money, which is
called damages."to Recogn izng thzt
a brezch of an insurance contract
could also be a violation of the
Montana Insurance Code such that
it would be an unlawfr¡l act under
527-I-202, the court held the situa-
tion distinguishable fuom Il/esfall, so
that punitive damages would be
Insurance bad faith and its attendant threat of punitive
damages are the most viable and effective tools
plaintiffls counsel has at his or her disposal for
enforcing duties and promises of insurance companies,
Montana and other states on the
duty of the insurer in considering
settlement offers. Jamison held that
"the insurer must give the interests
of its insured equal consideration
with its own interests and must in all
respect-s deal faidy with the in-
sured."' He set forth the factors the
insurer must consider in determining
whether to settle for the benefit of
its insured:
(1) whether, by reason of
the severity of the plaintiffs
injuries, any verdict is likely
to be greatly in excess of the
policy limits; (2) whether
the facts in the case indicate
that a defendant's verdict on
the issue of liability is
doubtful; (3) whether the
compariy has given due re-
gard to the recommenda-
tions of its trial counsel; (4)
whether the insured has
been informed of all settJe-
ment demands and offers;
(5) whether the insured has
demanded that the insurer
settle within the policy lim-
its; (6) whether the company
has given due consideration
to any offer of contribution
made by the insured.a
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zvail,able.I-¿r¡on was viewed as judi-
cial creation ofa new bad faith cause
of action based in statute.ll If an
insurer's breach of contract was also
a violation of the Montana Insur-
ance Code, then the defendant in-
surer was potentially liable under the
"unlawful act or omission" provi-
sion of 527-1,-202. Plaintiffs' anor-
neys would refer to this form of bad
faith as "tortious breach of the in-
surance code."
One should note here that, in
1959, Montana
adopted an in-
surance code for
the protection of
1ts cltlzens.
The 1959 code
lacked any com-
prehensive
statement of du-
ties an insurer owed its insured or
third-parry claimants. It did contain
provisions, which, if violated, might
provide a cause of action and puni-
tive damages under l-^ar¡0ru.
In 1982, the Montana
Supreme Cout decided tn Weber u.
Blue Cror of Montana,l3 that health
service corporations like Blue Cross
are not subject to the insurance code
(and hence, tortious breach of the
code), but are nevertheless subject
to a duty of good faith and poten-
tially liable for breach of that duty.
The court reasoned that the health
seryices corporation's superior bar-
gainrng position in relation to its
insured, the insureds' lack of voice
in negotiating the contracts and the
corporation's potential for oppres-
sive tactics in handling claims all
made it appropriate that it be subiect
to a good faith duty.'"
I^ipinski u. Title lrts. Co,'u made
it clear that there existed a cofiunort
law tort of bad fai¡h ¡hat applied to
insurance companies. The court
said, "[s]hould there be any doubt,
we now expressly hold that insut-
ance companies have a dutY to act in
good faith with their insureds, and
that this duty exists independent of
the insurance contract and indepen-
dent of statute."16 In l-ipinski, the
court recognized the prima facie tot
of insurance bad faith which would
support a punitìve damages clarm.
Advent of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act
Until 1977, the Montana In-
surarìce Code, contained no compre-
hensive statement of insurer's duties.
In 1977, the Monta:ra Legislature
added to the Code a set of L4
The court's holding virtually eliminated the actual
damage requirement and made a claim possible where
the insurer's handling of the claim was offensive even
though it ultimately did not owe the benefit it denied.
"snfah claims settlement practices"
which were forbidden by "any per-
son" acting "with such frequency as
to in4_icate a general business prac-
tice."'' These were codihed as MCA
S33-18-201 and have not been
amended since their adoption. Their
key prohibitions form the backbone
of the present bad faith insurance
remedies in Montana:
33-18-201 Unfair claim
settlement practices pro-
hibited. No person may,
with such frequency as to
indicate a general business
practice, do any of the fol-
lowing:
(1) misrepresent pertinent
facts or insurance policy
provisions relating to cover-
ages at issue;
Q) fall to acknowledge and
act reasonably promptly
upon coû)rnunications with
respect to claims arising un-
der insurance policies;
(3) fail to adopt and imple-
ment reasonable standards
for the prompt investigation
of claims arising under in-
surance policies;
(4) refuse to p^y claims
without conductìng a. tea-
sonable investigation based
upon all available informa-
tion;
(5) fail to affirm or deny
coverage of claims within a
reasonable time after proof
of loss statemènts have
been completed;
(ó) neglect to attempt in
good fatth to effectuate
prompt, fafu, zrrd equitable
setflements of
claims in
which liability
has become
reasonably
cleag
@ compel in-
sureds to ur-
stitute litiga-
tion to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy
by offering substantially less
than the arnounts ultimately
recovered in actions
brought by such insureds;
(8) attempt to settle z claim
fot less than the amount to
which a teasonzble m'¿n
would have believed he was
entitled by reference to writ-
ten or printed advertising
materizl accompanying or
made part of an application;
(9) attempt to settle claims
on the basis of an applica-
tion that was altered with-
out notice to or knowledge
or consent of the insured;
(10) make claims payments
to insureds or beneficiaries
not accompanied by state-
ments setting forth the cov-
erage under which the pay-
ments are berng made;
(11) make known to rn-
sureds or claimants a policy
of appealing from arbitn-
tion awards in favor of in-
sureds or claimants for the
purpose of compelhng them
to accept settlements or
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cornpromises less than the
amount awarded n aù:lilrz-
tion;
(L2) delay the investigatron
or payment of claims by
requiring afl insuted,
claimant, or physician of ei-
ther to submit a preliminary
claim repott and then re-
quiring the subsequent sub-
mission of formal proof of
loss forms, both of which
submissions contain sub-
stantially the same informa-
tion;
(13) fail to promptly setde
claims, if liability has be-
come reasorìably clear, un-
der one portion of the in-
surance policy coverage in
order to influence settle-
ments under other portions
of the insurance policy cov-
era$e:,of(a) fztl to promptly pro-
vide a reasonable explarn-
tion of the basis in the in-
surance policy in relation to
the facts or applicable law
for denial of a clakn or for
the offer of a compromise
settlement.
The statute, which constituted
a faiùy comprehensive statement of
prohibited practices of the insurers
in handling claims, would provide
the basis for pleading causes of ac-
tion for tortious breach of the insur-
ance code.
ln Fir¡t Secariry Bank of Bory
maft u. Goddørd,l8 the court recog-
nized that breach of an insurance
contract could "sound in tot al-
though it arises out of a breach of
contract, if a defaulting party, by
breaching the cont(act, also bteaches
a duty which he owes to the other
party iridependently of the con-
tract."te Though the court in Goddard
expressly found the insurer's con-
duct to be a breach of the insurance
code, it quoted the Caiifornia case of
Fletcher u. IY/estern National Life Ins.
Co.,'o say'rrg "An insurer owes its
insured an implied-inlaw duty of
good faith and fah dealing that it
will do nothing to deprive the n
sured of the benefits oFthe policy."21
Of prime importance in the case was
the court's holding that it was un-
necessary to prove actual malice for
punitive damages allowing a stan-
dard of implied malice to invoke the
darnage." This was deemed alarm-
ing to those who felt the eviàence in
Coddard only showed error and no
malice on the part of the insurer."
Harri¡ u. American Cen. IJfe Ins.
Co.,'o allowed a first-party benef,lt
clakn for punitive damages for bad
faith even though the jury ultimately
found no benefit due the claimant so
that the punitive damage claim was
not supported by any cornpensatory
damages. The court's holding virtu-
ally eliminated the actual. damzge
requirement and made a claim possi-
ble where the insurer's handling of
the claim was offensive evefl though
it ultimately did not owe the benefit
it denied.
u. Superior Court of Bøn Coantljs
when it overtumed a long line of
precedent by holding thar a third-
party claimant could sue an insur-
ance company for violating the Cali-
fornia "Unfzir Trade Practices ,\ct
(UTPA)".26 The California UTpA
was virtually identical to Monta¡a's
which made it predictable that Mon-
tana would follow suit as it did in
Klaudt u. Flink.z1 The Montana
Supreme Court held that a third-
paty clalrnant in Montana could
have a direct private civil right of
action against an insurer for breach
of $33-18-201, of the UTPA. The
court said the UTP,A. was meant for
the benefit of third-party claimants
as well as first-party insureds, ar-rd
held that the statute's preLmrnarl
requirement that the insurer's con-
duct be shown to occur "with such
frequency as to indicate a general
business practice" could be proven
by evidence of multiple violations of
the co^{e during handling of a single
clairn."
FIowever, the most striking
fleature oî the Klaudt decision was its
holding that the third-paty action
against the insurer for bad faith
"may be filed and tried before, con-
current with, or after liability has
been determined."2e Even Chief Jus-
tice Morrison, rccognized for his
consumer zdvocacy, warned aganst.
that holding. Joining of the underly-
ing action with the bad faith tort was
viewed as creating insurmountable
conflict for the insrrrer.'o
Not sulprisingly, after three
years of experimentation linkrng the
underlying action with the bad faith
action, the court overturned that as-
Development of Third-Party
Bad Faith
In 1979, the Cùifonia
Supreme Court delivered the block-
buster decision of Royl Globe In¡. Co.
MnnrcYoun CnILNDAKsI
þon't míss the
Anr'""1 fonventíon!
J"ly Z7-28, Zooo - Y ol"on, ffiontana
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oect of Rlaudt in the case of Fode u.
'For*rrc Ins. Exch.u'There, the court
held that bad faith ptoceedings al-
l"grg the insurer's violation of the
insurance code must be suspended
until the undedying claims have
been determined by settlement or
judgment. The court admitted that
Klaadt's procedure of allowing the
actrons to be joined was a mistake
that placed insurers in conflict and
causing them
prejudice.
Good Faith
and Fair Deal-
ing by the
Fiduciary
In L984,
the court revis-
ited Jusen when it decided the case
of Gibnn u. IYestern Firv lrus. C0'" L
first-parfy excess-coverage case.
While the court applied the original
Jesseru factors in upholding the
excess-coverage verdict against the
insurer, its decision reflected the
intervening evolution in law insofar
as the court treated the failure to
settle as a brezch of an implied
obligation of good fz.:rrh and fair
dealing by a fiduciary bound by a
duty of highest good faith. The
court said:
The duty to accept a reason-
able offerwithin policy cov-
erage limits arises from an
implied covenarit of good
futh and fair dealing that
neither party will do any-
thing which will injure the
right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agree-
ment. One of the usual ben-
efits of a liabtity insurance
policy is the setdement of
claims without litigation, or
at least without trial if the
cause is litigated. The im-
plied obligation of good
fai¡h ard fair dealing re-
quires the insurer to settle
rn an appropÅate case, aL-
though the express terms of
the policy do not impose the
duty. In determining
whether to settle, the insurer
must give the insured's in-
terest as much considera-
tlon3as it gives its own inter-
est.
ples of bad faith and not on the
UT?A (533-18-201). The court in
Gibson said that an insurer which
'"intentionally conceals material facts
within its knowledge and not known
by its insured rrray be found in bad
faith" so long as the facts concealed
are material to the sub¡ect of the
trust or duty of the fìduciary.uo The
court reasoned that the fiduciary is
bound to the highest good faith in
the subject of its trust. Note that the
UT?A does not treat the insurer's
concealing of materiai facts from the
insured as a basis for tortious bad
faith. Hence, Cibson presents an ex-
ample of conduct that is bad faith at
common law but not under the
statutes.
Legislative Restriction of
Bad Faith
The 1987 Montana Legisla-
ture was probably the most signifi-
cant in the state's history in terms of
"tort reform." Fear of the tort of bad
faith and punitive damages was an
obsession with insurance companies
and their allied banks. That year, the
insurance lobby secured legislatìve
restriction of insurance baí |rrithot
and punitrve damages'u. The ntent
was to limit the bad faith remedy to
certain conduct prohibited by the
UT?Á, and to create protections for
the insurers. The resulting bill, was
codifred as follows:
33-18-242. Independent
cause of action-burden of
proof.
(1) A" insured or a third-party
claimant has an independent
cause of action against an in-
surer for act:.tal damages
caused by the
insurer's viola-
tion of subsec-
tion (1), (4),
(s), (6), (e), or
(13) of 33-18-
201,.
Q)Inm action
under this sec-
tion, a plaintiff is not required
to prove that the violations
were of such frequency as to
indicate a genenl business
practice.
(3) 
'\tr insured who has suf-
fered damages as a result of
the handling of an insurance
claim may bring an action
against the insurer for breach
of the insurance contract, for
fraud, or pursuaflt to this sec-
tion, but not under any other
theory or cause of action. 
'{n
insured may not bring an ac-
tion for bad faith in connec-
tion with the handling of an
insurance claim.
(a) In an action under this
section, the court or jury may
award such damages as were
proximately caused by the vi-
olation of subsection (1), (4),
(5), (ó), (9), or (13) of 33-18-
20L. Exemplary damages may
also be assessed in accor-
dance with 27-1-221..
(5) A" insurer may not be
held liable under this sect-ion
if the insurer had a reasonable
basis in law or in fact for
contesting the claim or the
amount of the claim,
whichever is in issue.
T]rte Cibson case was based
entirely on iudicially created princi-
The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case, although
the express terms of the policy do not impose the duty.
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(6) (a) An insured may file an
action under this section, to-
gethet with any other cause
of action the insured has
against the insurer. Äctions
may be bifurcated for trial
where justice so requires.
(b) A third-party claimant
may not file an action under
this section until after the un-
derlying claim has been set-
tled or 
^judgment
entered in fa-
vor of the
claimant on
the underly-
ing claim.
fl) The pe-
riod pre-
scribed for commencemerìt
of an action under this sec-
tion is:
@) for an insured, within 2
years from the date of the
violation of 33-lB-201.; md
þ) for a third-party claimant,
within 1 year from the date of
the settlement of or the enttY
of judgment on the undedy-
ing claim.
(B) As used in this section, an
insurer includes a person,
frrm, or coqporation uttlizng
self-insurance to pay claims
made against them.
This statutorT restrictlon v/as
viewed as draconian and bittedy re-
sisted by the Montana Ttial Lawyers
Association. It pulports to limit bad
faith actions to certain specified
conduct in the handling of claims. It
provides the insuret an affrmztive
defense if it "l'rad a reasonable basis
in law or ln fact for contesting" a
claim. It purports to limit both first-
party and third-party claims, and it
shortens statutes of limltations in
fzvor of the insurers. Perhaps the
most insidious zspect of the statute
is its failure to include subsection @
of the U¡fair Claims Settlement
Practices Act,33-L8-201 as a basis
for the independent cause of action.
That subsection declares it to be an
unfair claims practice to:
compel insureds to institute
litigation to recover
âmounts due under an in-
surance policy by offering
substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recov-
ered in actions brought by
such insureds;
Legislative "reform" of punitive damages was also
key to restricting bad faith, since punitive damages
are an essential part of the remedy of insurance
company abuse of consumers and claimants.
That practice may be the most
frequent form of claims setdement
abuse by insurers and can cause the
innocent third party to incur unre-
covetable actual damages in the
form of attomey fees to obtain that
which should have been theirs in the
first place.
Nevertheless, the statute also
codiÍred a" private nght of action fot
third-paty bad faith claims for
breach of the UTPA. This was a
sþificant outcome in light of the
fact that Califomia's landmark Royl
Globe case, which originally created
the right, was later overtumed by
Moradi-Shalal u. Firvman'¡ Fand Ins.
ComparuiefT in a trend that ended
private rights of action for violation
of UTPA-type statutes in other
states. In the wake of Moradi-Shalal,
one of the principle insurance schol-
ars in the United States wrote,
"Although there are stjll remnants of
the private cause of action in a few
other states, it now appears to be a
development whose time has
passed."" The fact is the 1987 Mon-
tanz legislation granted statutory
recognition to the following:
contract;
2. Six categories of con-
duct of insurers which entr-
rle the third-party claimant
to the action;
3. Relief from the burden
of proving that the conduct
occurs with such frequency
as to indicate a general busi-
ness practice;
4. Punitive damages for
bad faith; and
5.Extension
of the cause of
action to self-
insurers.
The ttReformt'of
Punitive
Damages
Iægislatrve "reform" of puni-
trve damages was also key to restrict-
ing bad faith, since punitive damages
are an essenttd, partof the remedy of
insurance company abuse of con-
suners and claimants. Amrd fierce
lobbyng, the legislature statutorily
pulported to block punitive damages
ior 
-breach 
of conúãct3e ($21 -r-220);
required actual as opposed to im-
plied malice as a standard for puni-
tive damages ($27-I-221); required a
separate hearing on the amount of
punitive damages; stepped-up the
burden of proving punitive damages
to "clear and convincing' widence;
and enacted other procedural hur-
dles. The only bright spot was that
the legislature adopted the standard
for acr..ral malice from Owerus a.
Parker Dritling Ca.,ao which is mote
consurner friendly than the old statu-
tory standard of "malicious, fraudu-
lent or oppressive."
The Suwival of Common Law
Bad Faith
Enacünent of $33-IB-242, rc-
stricting the bad faith cause of action
under the UTPA, left questions
about the surviving state of cornmon
law bad faith tort as applied to insur-
ance. Plaintiffs' counsel wondered
whether any form of common law
insurance bad faith surwived the
1. Existence of a cause of
action for bad faith inde-
pendent of the insurance
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1987 legislanrre? Was there such a
thing as bad faith conduct outside
the handling of the claims? The
picture looked grim, and 533-1,8-242
was not the only blow the tort of
bad faith, as applied to insurance,
would suffer. In l-990, in the case of
Storl u. C;U of Boqeman,ot the Mon-
tana Supreme Court placed a severe
restriction on claims for bad faith
breach of contract which necessarily
applied to insur-
ance policies be-
cause they are
corfiracts. StorJl
involved a con-
struction con-
tract between a
contractor and
the City of
Bozeman. The pertinent cause of
action was the contractor's appen-
dant claim for bad faith tort based
on implied malice in the city's
breach of the construction contract.
The court held that there was no
cause of action for bad faith in the
breach of a contact, even if inten-
tional or malicious. The court re-
versed the development of the tort
of bad fairh as applied to contract
breaches when it reasoned that every
contract involves a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing so that
breach of that covenarit merely gives
rise to a clz:tm for breach of contract
and not a claim in ton.
llowever, the court recog-
nized an exception to its prohibition
against bad Faith tort in contract
claims for those situations involving
"special circumstances," in which a
special telationship existed between
the contracting partres that would
allow for z clair¡' of bad faith tort.
The court specified five factors for
identifying such a special relation-
ship:
(1) the contract must be
such that the parties are in
urherently unequal baryan-
ing positions; [and] (2) the
motivation for entering the
There the court said that a tlíird-party claimant could
bring an action against a claims adiuster as well
âs an insurer under 533-18-201 and $33-18-242.
contract must be a nofl-
profit motivation, i.e., to se-
cure peace of mind, secu-
tity, futute protection; fand]
(3) ordinary contract dam-
ages are not adequate be-
cause (a) they do not require
the party in the superior po-
sition to account for its ac-
tions, and þ) th"y do not
make the inferior pzfty
"whole"; fand] (+) one party
is especially vulnerable be-
cause of the type of harm it
may suffer and of necessity
places trust in the other
party to perform; and (5) the
other parry is aware of this
vulnerability.a2
The immediate question was
whether the relationship between ifl-
sured and insurer was a "special
relationship." In StEltew u. Safeco lns.
Co. of Anerica," the court applied the
Flve Story factors to the contract be-
tween ari insured and insurer and
found it was. Stephens predated the
UTP,\'s restrictions on bad faith
claims, though it was decided after
enactment of the UTPA. Neverthe-
less, it is important that, in Stelshen:,
the court recognized the existence of
cofirnon law bad faith tort outside
the context of the Unfair Trade Set-
tlement Practices Act:
[]nsurance companies have
a duty to act in good faith
with their insureds, and this
duty exists independent of
the insurance contract and
rndependent of statute. If
this duty is breached the
cause of action of the in-
In O'Fa/lon u. Farmers Iru¡.
Exclt.,os the court held that an in-
suted could bnng a cornmon law
action if the Unfair Trade Settlement
Practices Äct did not apply. There
the court said that a third-party
claimant could bring an action
against a claims adjuster as well as
an insurer under
533-18-201 a¡d
s33-1,8-242. The
cout said KkadtI
zuthorizztton of z
direct action
against a "persofl"
under $33-18-201
was not in conflict
with $33-1 8 -242, which provides for
the statutory cause of action agunst
insurers but did not "othetwise limlt
previously cteated coffunorì law
causes of zciton." llowever, z
clarmant ptessing an action against
an adjuster under $33-18-201 must
prove that the conduct occurs "with
such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice" under that
statute, while an action agatnst an
insurer under $33-18-242 is relieved
of that burden of proof.
The Recent Life of Bad Faith in
Insurance
In 1998, the coutt identified a
whole arca of ìnsurer conduct not
govemed by the UTPA and hence
not subject to the bad faith resffic-
tions of 533-18-242. In Thomat u.
Northwutern National Iru¡arance Com-
pool,ou the Thomases sued their in-
surer, Northwestern National, for
neglþnce, bad faith, and breach of
fiduciary duty after the carrier re-
fused to defend them on a pollution
claim arising frcman oil spill caused
by their plumbing business. The
Thomases contended that North-
westem had a duty to wam them,
upon annual renewal of their com-
mercial general insurance policy, that
the company had inserted a more
suted against
sounds in tort.
the insurer
44
milI
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restrictive "Total Pollution Exclu-
sion" resulting in a lack of coverage
for the spill. It followed that the
Thomases claimed the insurer
breached its fiduciary obligation and
acted in bad faith in not waming
them of the detrimental change in
the policy. The case is signifrcant in
two areas: First, collateral to the bad
faith issues, the court found that
Northwestern did have a duty to
warn of the
more restrictive
pollution exclu-
sion and estab-
lished that insur-
ers have the bur-
den of proving
that they pro-
vided adequate
notice of policy changes to their
insureds.
Second, Northwestern suc-
cessfi.rlly persuaded the lower court
that Montana's UTPA' specifically
533-'1,8-242(3) precluded the
Thomases' corrrnon law claims for
neglþnce, bad faith, and breach of
fiduciary duty. However, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court disagreed that
these were claims arising out of the
"handling of an insurance claim" so
as to bring them within the restric-
tions of the statute. The court noted
that the obvious intent of the UTPÁ.
was to protect insureds from unfair
ffeatrnent by insurers in the handling
of claims. The Thomases' claims
focused on Northwestern's conduct
during the renewal of the policy
prior to the handling of the claims.
The court found that the leg-
islature did not intend the UTPA to
be the exclusive remedy for insureds
bringrng litigaúon against their in-
surers and noted the language of
533-18-242(6)(a) that "an insured
may íJ-Je an action under this section,
rogether with an1 olher caurc of actiorc the
insured has again:t tlte ifliurcr."
[author's emphasis] However,
Northwestern also contended that
Story blocked any collateral tort
claim since this w¿s z clzim for
breach of the contractual insurance
policy promises. The court applied
the fìve element analysis of Story and
confirmed that the relationship be-
tween the insureds, Thomases, and
insurer, Northwestern, was a
"special relationship" which could
support a bad faìú action. Further-
more, the court concluded that the
Thomases' claims of bad faith and
breach of fiduciary duty survived
533-IB-242, because the common
law, in that situation, was not in
conflict with $33-18-242. T\e court
reiterated what it said in OFallon:
Insurers hzve z duty to act in good
faiùt, and that duty still exists inde-
pendent of the insurance contract
and statute.
The court recently expanded
rights of third-party ìnsureds under
the UTPA in resolving the conflict
that occurs when the clzrnant can-
not sþ a fuIl and final release and
the insurer refuses to tender mini-
mum limits without such signing. In
[Yatters u. Guaranþt National Ins. Co.,a1
the court said:
ffie hold that where an
insured's liability for dam-
ages caused to a third paty
in an auto accident is rea-
sonably clear, and those
damages undisputedly ex-
ceed the mandatory limits
set forth under $61-6-L03,
MCA, it is an unfair trade
przcttce per se under $33-18-
201, MCA, for an insurer to
condition the payment of
the owed mandatory mini-
mum policy limits on the
third party's agreement to
provide a full and find, rc-
lease of all liability in favor
of an insured.
The court also made the logr-
cal holding that an insurer which, rn
a cleadiability excess-damages case,
pays minimum limits without ob-
tainrng a fi¡ll and fìnal release, is not
þer rcacingin bad faith.
Guaranty National had taken
the position that, under $33-18-
201(6), ít had a
duty "to effectu¿te
prompt, fah a¡d
equitable settle-
ments of claims"
[author's empha-
sis] and that, under
Jaedenan a. Na
tioza/ Farmers
48Unioru,'" without an agreement for
release, there could be no settlement.
Guannty claimed it conditioned its
tender of minimum limits on sþing
of the release, because it feared a
bad faith action by its insured if it
did not. The court noted that the
policy provided no promise by the
insurer that it would obtain a release
and that a minimum limits insured
could have no such expectation in
the circumstances. Most importantly,
the court said it would not second
guess the legislature's provision in
UTPA 533-18-242Q) that "An in-
sured may not bring an zclton for
bad faith in connection with the
handling of an insurance claim."
Consequently, the court held that the
insurer may no longer impose the
full and final release as a condition
to settlement in minimum limits
cases.
This has two imports: First, it
will be easier to convince carriers to
prompdy pay mrnimum limits to
third-party claimants. Second, as
pointed out by Gary Zadick, who
even before this case counseled car-
riers to pay such hmits without de-
manding a release, claimant's coun-
sel will lose the "setup" for bad faith
which occurs when carriers condi-
tion payment of minimum lrnits in
The court recently expanded rights of third-party insureds
under the UTPA in resolving the conflict that occurs when
the claimant cannot sign a full and final release and the
insurer refuses to tender minimum limits without such signing
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clearJiability bad-damages cases on
sþitrg of full and ftnøJ releases.
"Setup" aside, the holding is a good
sound step in effectuating prompt
and fe¡lr settlements.
The biggest recent news from
the bad faith front is the coutt's
holding n Brewington u. Enpklers Firv
Iw. Co.,oo that the UTPA does not
preempt corrunon law claims for
third-party bad faith. On appeal to
the Montana Supteme Court, Brew-
ington won a workers'
compensation decision
granting him perma-
rient total disability
benefits and ordering
Employers Fire Insur-
ance and Commercial
Union to pay his bene-
fits and attomey fees. BrewinSon
later sued defendants for breach of
the duty of good fai¡h arÅ fm deal-
ing claiming that they refused to pay
the attomey fees as ordered and
engaged in a course of continuous
tortious conduct. The district court
dismissed Brewington's complaint
on the ground that the statute of
limitations governing third-party
claims under the UTPA barred the
bad faith claims brought by his per-
sonal representative. Ffowever, the
Supreme Court found the UTP,\ did
not apply. The court noted that sub-
sectron (1) granted an insurvd or a
third-par4t clairnant an independent
cause of action against an insurer for
breach of the UTPA. llowever, the
court pointed out that subsection (3)
limiting actions against the insurer to
bteach of contract, fraud, or the
specified conduct of the UTPA and
forbidding "any other theory or
cause of zctfon" applied only to afl
iru¡arvd. That subsection did not men-
tion third-þarfl claimarcts. Conse-
quentl¡ the court held that 533-18-
242 does not preclude a third-party
clzimart from bringing an action for
conunon law bad faith.
On the basis of that holding
the court then found that the
UTPA's statute of limitations of one
year from settlement or entry of
judgment did not apply. Instead, the
court held that the statute for third-
party common law bad faith claims
is the three years provided under
527-2-204. Justice Gtay concurred
that subsection (3) of $33-78-242did not âpply to third-party
claimants but appeared to do so
unhappily and all but told the legisla-
ture to amend. Flence, this decision
which is music to those reptesenting
The tort of insurance bad faith and the attendant
potential for punitive damages are potent weapons
in the fight to make insurance companies honor
their promises and duties to claimants and insureds.
claimants against insuters may pto-
voke a legislative response. That is a
good reminder that the law of insur-
ance bad faith is made in paft by
those legislators who win their cam-
pabns.
Brvwingtoru aside, counsel
should note the potential statute of
limitations pitfall in 533-1,-242Q).
The limitation under subsection ff
for third-party claimants is one year
from the date the undedying claim is
brought to conclusion, but the
statute for first-parry claims is two
years from the alleged occurrence of
the bad faith. Hence, counsel litigat-
ing a firsrparty claim like UIM may
forget the running of the statute
thinking it is preserved until resolu-
tion of the undedying claim. As Pat
Sheehy sâys, "It's a short porch."
Finally, the court has just held
n Safem [ns. Co. u. Mortana t' ¡adicial
Dist. Court,so that a declaratory judg-
ment action brought to enforce ad-
vance payment of medical expense
pursuarit to Nd/q u. Guaranry Nat'l
lns. C0.,"' is not barred by the UTPA,
533-18-242(6)(b) and my be
brought before the undedying claim
has been disposed of by settlement
or judgment. lUhile this decision is
premised on Medical Pay coverage,
it means that plaintiffls counsel can
use declaratory judgment to enforce
or clarify rights under any coverage
before the undedying claim is settled
or adjudicated so long as the action
doesn't seek bad faith damages for
violation of the UTP,\.
Conclusion
fnsurance bad faith tort is
alive in Montana. We are in the
unusual situation of having codified
the private right of action for third-
paty claimants un-
der the UTPA while
that right has disap-
peared or never ex-
isted in most other
states. The third-
pafty common law
action for bad faith
has been affirmed 'rn Bruwington, as
has the cofirnon law action for first-
parry bad faith for insurer miscon-
duct prior to handling of the claim.
First-paty claims for conduct during
handling of the claim are codifred
with a comprehensive set of prohib-
ited insurer conduct, allowance of
punitive damages and relief from the
burden ofproving such frequency of
the insurer's conduct as to be a
general business practice. First and
third-party claimants ma¡ during the
underlying litigation, in spite of any
prohibition of the UTPA, seek
declaratory judgments to enforce
coverage rights. The recent Thomaq
Brewington, atd lYatter¡ decisions in-
dicate that the Montana Supreme
Court will carefirlly scrutjnize the
UTPA and expansively interpret it to
allow insurance consumers and
third-party claimants the remedies
necessary to pfomote pfompt, fair,
and equitable settlements.
The tort of insurance bad faith
and the attendânt potential for puni-
tive damages are potent weapons in
the fight to make insurance compa-
nies honor their promises and duties
to claimants and insureds. Conse-
quendy, one can expect that bad
faith tort will always be under ztrack,
so vigilance by plaintiffs' counsel in
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court and on the campaign trail will
be necessary to keep the weapon
rhæp.
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